SQUARING THE CIRCLE: DEMOCRATIZING JUDICIAL REVEW
AND THE COUNTER-CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY
Miguel Schor1
I. Introduction: the Counter-Constitutional Difficulty
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control
the violence of faction. The friend of popular government never finds himself so
much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value to
any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides
a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into
public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished.2
A season in the appointments war
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was the swing vote in a closely divided Supreme
Court. In decisions decided 5 to 4 from 1994 through 2005, Justice O’Connor had the
highest batting average of all the justices as she voted with the majority 77% of the time.3
The announcement of her retirement on July 1, 2005 launched a barrage of interest group
activity.4 The sense of urgency was heightened by the death of Chief Justice William
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Rehnquist on September 3, 2005. The Rehnquist Court had gone eleven years without
any change in its membership5 and President Bush now had two vacancies to fill.
Although hot button issues such as abortion6 and same-sex marriage7 mobilized the
ideological forces arrayed in the appointments brawl engendered by Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s death and Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the Rehnquist Court reflected
broader ideological conservative currents that look askance at the growth of federal
power.8
The opening salvo was fired by conservative groups who met within hours of
Justice O’Connor’s retirement. They sought to prevent President Bush from nominating
his attorney general, Alberto R. Gonzales, because they believed his views on abortion to
be suspect.9 The debate became so heated that President Bush and the Senate Republican
leadership asked conservatives to avoid divisive cultural issues such as abortion and
same-sex marriage in discussing nominations and to use language that tested well in polls
such as a “fair and dignified confirmation process.”10 President Bush’s nomination of
Judge John Roberts dampened down the fighting as Roberts had both a distinguished
resume and a thin record on divisive social issues.11 The only real opposition President
Bush might have faced in nominating Judge Roberts to the Supreme Court was among
social conservatives. The White House, however, had carefully prepared for this
possibility by spreading the word for at “least a year” before Judge Roberts’s nomination
that he was safe on issues such as “abortion, same-sex marriage, and public support for
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religion.”12 During the Senate hearings on his appointment, Judge Roberts articulated a
pragmatic and eclectic approach to interpreting the Constitution that put him at variance
with Justices Scalia and Thomas.13 Roberts was confirmed by a vote of 78 to 22.
President Bush’s nomination of White House Counsel Harriet Ellan Miers on
October 3, 2005, however, led to a firestorm on the President’s right flank. Editorials
were written by prominent public intellectuals criticizing Miers’s closeness to the
President and lack of talent.14 Conservatives broke decisively with the President over her
nomination even though the White House and its allies repeatedly sought to reassure
social conservatives.15 Social conservatives had long sought to remake the Court and
believed that Harriet Miers lacked the judicial DNA they desired in a justice.16 The
interest group activity revolving around her nomination had a surreal quality as liberal
interest groups largely held their fire while conservatives paid for television
advertisements featuring Robert Bork that opposed her nomination.17 Conservative
opposition played an important role in Miers’s decision to withdraw her nomination on
October 27, 2005.18
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Miers’s withdrawal was quickly followed by the nomination of Judge Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. His impeccable conservative record mobilized interest groups along more
natural fault lines than had Miers’s nomination.19 The caliber of his intellectual
credentials meant that his nomination would have to be opposed on mainly ideological
grounds.20 A pair of memorandums written by Alito opposing abortion when he had
been a member of the Reagan administration, however, did not lead to an all out
ideological fight21 even though interest groups on the left and the right sought to mobilize
their supporters.22 Judge Alito explained that the memos were his personal rather than
his judicial views which successfully dampened some of the opposition.23 His measured
words during his Judiciary Committee hearings further defused the opposition.24 There
was much stronger opposition to Judge Alito in the Senate, however, than there had been
to Judge Roberts because of Judge Alito’s embrace of originalism in constitutional
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interpretation during his hearings25 and his conservative track record. Judge Alito was
confirmed by a divided Senate vote of 58 to 42 largely along party lines.26
The appointments of John Roberts and Samuel A. Alito represent the culmination
of two decades of efforts by conservatives to remake the Supreme Court.27 The
mobilization of social conservatives has been fueled by opposition to abortion and samesex marriage, and a desire for a greater role for religion in the public life of the nation.28
The extraordinary split among conservatives over the appointment of Harriet Miers
illustrates the importance that social conservatives attach to judicial nominations. By
opposing Miers’s nomination, social conservatives made it clear that they would not be
satisfied by a conservative nominee who lacked a clear track record on issues important
to them. There is, of course, no assurance that either Justice Roberts or Justice Alito will
vote in ways that please social conservatives. Predicting how a justice will vote based on
an ideological label is an uncertain science, as political scientists Lee Epstein and Jeffrey
Segal concede.29 The internal dynamics of the Supreme Court sometimes lead Justices to
change their ideology over time. In spite of this uncertainty, however, the heightened
role that interest groups play in judicial nominations is helping to create a more
ideological and partisan Court.30 As the events of the current appointments season draw
to a close, it is clear that constitutional politics is being transformed by the efforts of
interest groups to place their partisans on the nation’s highest court. This Article will
explore the role that popular mobilization plays in constitutional politics in comparative
perspective.
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The counter-constitutional difficulty,
the problem of constitutional theory, and democratizing judicial review
In what has become the most famous of the Federalist Papers, James Madison
argued that the new republic had a number of mechanisms that would alleviate the
problem of faction that had undermined so many democracies throughout time.31 The
solution was, in part, to entrench the Constitution from the channels of ordinary political
change. Majorities might rule when it came to political matters32 but a supermajority
would be required to change the Constitution.33 Constitutions play a key role in
facilitating democratic politics. Democracies require the alternation in power between
opposing groups.34 Competing groups or factions mistrust each other, however. That
mistrust is lessened if a constitution limits what a group may do once in power.
Maintaining the distinction between constitutions and ordinary laws is critical for the
longevity of democracy as constitutions protect the interests of those not in power. The
political stakes in gaining power rise and democracies become unstable when
constitutions can be as readily changed as ordinary legislation.35
This Article argues that the trust needed for democratic politics to function well is
threatened by the recent appointments wars. The stiff supermajority requirements built
into Article V have been undermined by the constitutional politics facilitated by the rules
governing judicial appointments.36 There is even less democratic protection built into the
appointments process than in enacting legislation since the former requires only Senate
approval. As the battles during the current appointments season illustrate, presidents pay
attention to factions that are important to their coalition and that care deeply about the
ideology of who sits on the Court. The counter-constitutional difficulty is that the
struggle by social conservatives to place their partisans on the United States Supreme
Court introduces the problem of faction into constitutional politics and renders hollow the
protection afforded by Article V of the Constitution.
Under the long intellectual shadow cast by Alexander Bickel, however,
constitutional theory has paid little attention to the tension between the Supreme Court
and the Constitution and focused instead on the tension between the Supreme Court and
democratically elected legislatures. The issue Bickel raised is how the power of a nonelected branch of government to thwart the decisions of elected officials can be justified
31
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in a democracy.37 Although Bickel raised the issue almost half a century ago, the
countermajoritarian difficulty remains a vital issue in constitutional theory.38 As
Professor Brown artfully describes Bickel’s legacy, at “Bickel’s instigation, contender
after contender has stepped forward to try a hand at pulling the sword of judicial review
from the stone of illegitimacy.”39
The various solutions proposed by Bickel’s interlocutors to the
countermajoritarian difficulty assume that the problem dissolves when the correct theory
is crafted that explains when judicial review is an exercise in law rather than in politics.40
The legal scholarship that has clustered around Bickel’s issue focuses, therefore, on the
internal, cultural software that judges should be programmed with if judicial review is to
be legitimate in a democracy.41 As a consequence of Bickel’s influence, less academic
37
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ink has been spilled on the problem of external controls of judicial review than has been
on the problem of internal controls. The problem of constitutional theory is that it paid
too much attention to interpretive niceties while ignoring the problem of how courts
should be made politically accountable.42 The problem of judicial review is not that it is
countermajoritarian but that it is potentially counter-constitutional.
Rather than explore how judges ought to interpret the Constitution, this Article
will examine the external hardware of democratic checks on judicial review by
comparing the American experience with that of other successful long-term democracies
in Western Europe and Canada. Part II of this Article examines why the American model
of weak democratic checks on judicial review—lifetime tenure after nomination by the
President and confirmation by a bare majority of the Senate—has not worked well.43 The
appointments process for the Supreme Court has long been politicized but the influence
that factions now play is a recent and troubling trend. Long-term historical and
institutional changes that transformed the Court into a powerful political institution have
led to a political backlash as interest groups vie to influence nominations. Presidents now
understand that they can use nominations as a form of coinage to build support and help
fashion factions. Appointments battles have become part of the landscape of American
constitutional battles.44
The solution to an overly democratized nomination process lies paradoxically in
democratizing judicial review by strengthening the tools by which citizens may hold
courts politically accountable. Parts III and IV discuss respectively how Western Europe
and Canada learned from our experience with weak political accountability for judicial
review to fashion different and stronger democratic constraints. These polities rather
understandably rejected the notion that there is a sharp division between law and politics
and that a court construing the Constitution would be a court of law. The American
system of weak political controls over the judiciary was adopted because the founders
mistrusted democracy and pinned their hopes on republican virtue. The Supreme Court is
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the vestigial remnant of an older notion of politics where only the few participated
because only elites had the necessary virtue to govern.45 The framers, moreover, could
not foresee the role that the Supreme Court would play in American politics. If the
framers made no explicit provision for judicial review in the Constitution, then a fortiori
they did not give sustained thought to the problem of the accountability of the least
dangerous branch. The rest of the world chose a different path because of political
learning.46 Other polities considered and rejected adopting American style judicial
review with its weak democratic constraints because they learned from the American
experience that constitutional courts are political as well as legal institutions. Courts can
be held politically accountable either ex ante by means of appointments or post facto by
providing mechanisms for a democratic override of constitutional interpretations.47 The
nations of Western Europe chose a different and more democratic political appointments
process than the United States.48 By adopting supermajority appointments procedures,
the European model of judicial review reduces the power of factions to influence
constitutional interpretation. Fearing the power of the American Supreme Court, Canada
provides for the possibility of a legislative override of its Supreme Court.49 Factions are
unlikely to choose the uncertain path of influencing appointments when they can seek a
legislative override of constitutional interpretations.
This Article argues that different models of judicial review should be judged not
according to normative criteria but rather from a much different vantage point which is
how alternative forms of judicial review structure politics.50 As Donald Kommers
argues, comparative constitutional law “illuminate[s] the relationship between American
courts and democracy.”51 Comparative constitutional law also opens the door to a
different appreciation of our Constitution. In an important new book, Sanford Levinson
argues persuasively that a critical tradition is lacking in American constitutional
thought.52 One can be committed to the goals of the Constitution contained in its
45
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Preamble while thinking that many of its provisions have not withstood the test of time.
Comparative analysis obviously has a key role to play in any critical understanding of the
Constitution.53 The framers were men of exceptional talent but they quite obviously
lacked the “knowledge that might be gained from later experience with democracy in
America and elsewhere.”54 American exceptionalism when it comes to appointments has
not served the United States well. By democratizing judicial review, other polities have
made courts more politically accountable and thereby reduced the power of factions to
change the meaning of the Constitution.
II. American Exceptionalism and Distrust
The American Constitution has thus by and large remained a constitution properly
so called, concerned with constitutive questions. What has distinguished it, and
indeed the United States itself, has been a process of government, not a governing
ideology. . . . ‘As a charter of government a constitution must prescribe legitimate
processes, not legitimate outcomes, if like ours (and unlike more ideological
documents elsewhere) it is to serve many generations through changing times.’55
There is considerable disagreement whether judicial review enhances or
undermines democracy. The most famous attempt to argue that judicial review promotes
democracy is John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust.56 Professor Ely sought to drive a
stake in the heart of the countermajoritarian difficulty by arguing that the Supreme Court
was not a deviant institution in a democracy. The tension between democracy and the
Supreme Court that lay at the root of Bickel’s problem dissolves when the Court acts as a
referee that polices the mechanisms of democracy:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and
the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or vote,
53
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representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority.57
The Warren Court was not, as Bickel suggested, a problem that constitutional theory had
to surmount but rather provides an exemplary model of how the Court ought to function.
Courts should, and the Warren Court did,58 take an “antitrust” rather than a “regulatory”
approach to politics by protecting democratic participation rather than imposing
substantive outcomes. The Supreme Court, in short, engenders trust when it effectuates
democratic participation.
There is little doubt that Ely’s theory resonates deeply with core assumptions
about courts and democracy. Democracy is commonly defined in procedural terms as a
set of rules for structuring political competition.59 Polities throughout the world adopted
judicial review when they democratized because courts serve as “an alternative forum in
which to challenge governmental action” and thereby provide a “form of insurance to
prospective electoral losers during the constitutional bargain.”60 Polities throughout
space and time have relied on courts to ameliorate conflict because it is universally
recognized that the fairest means to deal with disagreement is to have a neutral third party
resolve the matter.61 John Roberts invoked this universal logic in the opening statement
of his nomination hearings when he argued that “[j]udges are like umpires” because
“[u]mpires don’t make the rules, they apply them.” 62 Samuel Alito also based his
opening statement on this logic: “A judge can’t have an agenda . . . and a judge certainly
doesn’t have a client. The judge’s only obligation—and it’s a solemn obligation—is to
the rule of law.”63
Although Ely’s theory is normatively attractive, it fails to realistically appraise
either the work of the Warren Court or its impact on American politics. The Warren
Court was revolutionary because it articulated and protected substantive rights.64
Although the founders built substantive commitments into the Constitution, the Supreme
Court did not become serious about effectuating rights until the Constitutional Revolution
of 1937.65 The post-1937 jurisprudence of the Court had a profound influence on
57
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constitutional politics as factions or interest groups formed in response to the substantive
rights articulated by the Court. Political activity increasingly became oriented towards
the judicial arena. Interest groups sought to change the law by bringing test cases66 and
by changing the membership of the Court. As a consequence, Americans began to see
themselves as the bearers of legally enforceable rights rather than as participants in a
political process that would determine those rights.67
The political activity awakened by the Warren Court illustrates that Ely was
wrong to argue that nations are constituted solely by a commitment to legitimate
processes. Nations are “imagined communities” whose members do not know each other
yet share important bonds.68 The American Revolution created a new model or template
for building a nation by using a constitution, rather than language or ethnicity, to found a
political community. Professor Tushnet makes a critical contribution to our
understanding of how the American nation was forged by arguing that there are two parts
to the Constitution: one part regulates the government; the other speaks to who we are as
a people.69 The substantive provisions played an important role in the political battles
that shaped the nation. From Dred Scott v. Sanford,70 to Lochner v. New York,71 to
Brown v. Board of Education,72 to Roe v. Wade,73 the Supreme Court has never been the
final word when speaking to the fundamental values that constitute the nation. The
argument that the “Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution” ought to be
“treated as having status equivalent to the Constitution itself” 74 has fortunately never had
any purchase with either politicians or the public.
The American Supreme Court is exceptional among the world’s supreme or
constitutional courts because it has weak rules of political accountability. Changing the
constitution’s meaning by replacing its members is not an attractive political strategy in
nations that follow either the European75 or Canadian models of judicial review.76 A core
argument of this Article is that although supreme or constitutional courts throughout the
world generate political controversy, it is unlikely that factions will form to transform the
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constitution by having partisans appointed to supreme courts in other polities because
they have stronger and more democratic rules of political accountability. By
democratizing judicial review, polities can avoid the faction strewn shoals of American
judicial appointments. The politicization of the appointments process in the United
States, moreover, has eroded the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Courts can ameliorate
political conflict only if they are perceived as neutral arbiters. Religious conservatives
have made it clear, however, that they will support only nominees with a clear ideological
track record. If the justices of the Court are identified with a political faction, the
Supreme Court undermines rather than facilitates the trust needed for democracy to work.
In short, the appointments wars have negative, long-term consequences for American
democracy.
A. Legal mobilization and constitutional politics
Scholars disagree whether the appointments wars constitute something new in
constitutional politics. One view is that ideology has mattered since the founding of the
republic.77 The opposing view is that the Reagan administration transformed judicial
appointments by imposing an ideological litmus test for all nominations.78 There is little
doubt that ideology and interest group mobilization play an unprecedented role in judicial
appointments that increasingly look like elections. The elite centered appointment
struggles of the 19th and early 20th century have now become full fledged democratic
brawls as the public has a place at the table. Professor Davis, for example, concludes
“The transformation of the Supreme Court appointment process into a mechanism similar
to that of an electoral campaign has occurred because of the introduction of new,
powerful players—the news media, interest groups, and public opinion.”79
What is not well understood, however, are the historical and institutional
processes that led citizens to mobilize to seek to transform the meaning of the
Constitution by changing the membership of the Supreme Court. The existing literature
focuses on the political battles to shape the Court while largely ignoring the role the
Court plays in mobilizing citizens. Yet a review of the history of appointments struggles
77
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in the United States demonstrates the role law plays in shaping the formation of interest
groups that seek to change the law and the role that legal mobilization plays in
transforming the law.80 Legal mobilization, in short, is both a consequence and a cause
of constitutional change.
Today’s democratic appointments battles are being fought on an institutional
terrain that was not designed for public participation. Although there was considerable
disagreement at the Constitutional convention over how Supreme Court justices were to
be appointed, the compromise that was reached made the President the primary player in
the appointment process.81 Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court.” The president was made the key player in
nominating justices because it was thought that he would be best able to select qualified
individuals.82 The process was designed to be free of popular politics as neither the
President nor the Senate were directly elected. The framers did not and could not foresee
that the Revolution would transform a hierarchical and deferential society where elites
governed with little public participation into an egalitarian society.83 Appointments were
designed to be an elite-centered process where virtue would trump interest.84
The Appointments Clause was also designed for a very different constitutional
universe than the one we inhabit today. The modern view that the Supreme Court is an
important policymaker was not shared by the founders. The founders assumed that law
was fixed and immutable and that change would occur only through the political
processes.85 The constitutional assumptions that gave birth to Article II, section 2 of the
Constitution are illustrated in a case that looms large in the constitutional imagination,
Marbury v. Madison.86 Marbury was decided in the maelstrom of a political battle.
Having lost control of the presidency and the legislature in the 1800 elections, the
Federalists sought to retain power by packing the judiciary with their partisans.87
Marbury was a disappointed Federalist nominee and his suit threatened to ignite a battle
80
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between the Court and the President that John Marshall wanted to avoid. Marshall
successfully navigated the political shoals of the dispute, in part, by drawing a “line,
which nearly all citizens of his time believed ought to be drawn, between the legal and
the political—between those matters on which all Americans agreed and which therefore
were fixed and immutable and those matters which were subject to fluctuation and
change through democratic politics.”88 When Justice Marshall opined that Marbury’s
right to the judicial commission was akin to a property right, Americans understood that
these were rights that were to be preserved by courts against democratic processes.
Marbury v. Madison was understood by contemporaries to be an important decision that
“generate[d] [surprisingly] little controversy” because it rested on the “largely
unarticulated” operative constitutional assumptions of the day.89
Although the division between law and politics drawn by Marshall was largely
unchallenged before the Civil War, many Supreme Court decisions did arouse political
controversy. The Marshall Court was a nationalist institution in an era when state
loyalties were strong. Its nationalist decisions led to “heated public controversy.”90 The
opposition “ranged from outright defiance of judicial rulings to protests and memorials
against Court action directed to Congress and other states.”91 This opposition, however,
did not lead to a sustained challenge to the power of the Court. The states were unable to
ally and present a united front against the Court since opposition coalesced around
individual decisions rather than the Court as an institution. Popular control over the
Court was largely a non-issue before the Civil War as the Court was considerably more
limited in its powers and citizens were more prone to ignore its edicts.92
The institutional seeds that would eventually facilitate the development of
ideological popular warfare in judicial appointments were planted in the wake of the
Civil War.93 The Court had an important new weapon in its arsenal as the Fourteenth
Amendment provided important restrictions that could be enforced against the states.94
The Due Process Clause furnished the Court with an institutional lever of power around
which social forces would henceforth coalesce. In addition, federal courts were provided
with broader jurisdiction to “redirect civil litigation involving national commercial
interests out of state courts and into the federal judiciary.”95 In short, federal courts now
had sufficient power to elicit sustained popular opposition.
The institutional transformations that occurred after the Civil War cannot be
understood in a political and social vacuum. Business interests were politically ascendant
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and sought to use the courts to facilitate the development of a national economy. In the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, constitutional politics revolved around the issue
of government regulation of capitalism. Economic growth transformed American society
after the Civil War.96 Businesses changed from being primarily family run operations
before 1870 to larger bureaucratic organizations that were able to fend of regulation by
means of strategic litigation.97 The managers of these businesses “formed professional
associations and networks of communications that allowed them to learn from each
other.”98 The railroads, in particular, played a key role in shaping the contours of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As the “first modern, interstate industry that intimately affected
the economic interests of virtually all of American society,” there was considerable
popular pressure to subject the railroads to regulation and they responded with a
“systematic litigation campaign challenging the constitutional validity of government
regulation in the courts.”99
Attempts by business interests to shield themselves from regulation was met with
popular opposition as “populists, progressives, and labor leaders subjected both state and
federal courts to vigorous and persistent criticism and proposed numerous plans to
abridge judicial power.”100 Popular forces mounted a two pronged attack on judicial
power. One prong was directed at weakening judicial power by scholars and politicians
who questioned the propriety of judicial review.101 The other prong involved two
attempts to derail Supreme Court nominations. The first was by the National Grange
which was a national organization that played an important role in influencing states to
enact legislation regulating railroads.102 The Grange sought to further the goals of its
members by becoming involved in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to defeat the
appointment of Stanley Matthews, who as a Senator had been an important spokesman
for the railroads.103 The Grange mounted a vigorous campaign against Matthews who
was ultimately confirmed 24 to 23 in 1881. The closeness of the vote is remarkable
given that Senators were not directly elected. The enactment of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913 facilitated the second attempt by populist forces to derail a Supreme
Court nomination.104 President Hoover’s nomination of Judge John Parker in 1930
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aroused opposition by organized labor as well as by the NAACP.105 Parker’s nomination
was defeated by a vote of 41 to 39. The campaigns that revolved around the nominations
of Stanley Matthews and John Parker are a clear harbinger of current appointment battles.
The jurisprudence of the Lochner era, like that of the Marbury era, rested on
largely unspoken assumptions as to the proper dividing line between law and politics.
The Court sought to curtail legislative attempts to deal with the social ills created by
capitalism by holding that it rested on constitutionally suspect factional politics.
Professor Gillman writes “The judiciary’s persistent attachment to traditional limits on
legislative power represented the final defense of a principle of constitutional legitimacy
that the framers sought to permanently enshrine in fundamental law.”106 The framers
sought to erect a neutral state that could not constitutionally enact legislation favoring
factions. The “master principle” of the Constitution, as articulated in the Federalist No.
10, was that “[G]ood republican government required institutional structures that were
popular yet still divorced from the corrupting influence of ‘factions,’ defined by Madison
. . . as a number of citizens, majority or minority, united by some common passion or
interest (usually arising out of ‘the various and unequal distribution of property’) that was
adverse to the ‘permanent and aggregate interests of the community.’”107 In short, the
Court sought to protect a vision of democratic politics where legislatures could not enact
legislation that would protect or favor interest groups.
The popular opposition that arose to Lochner and its progeny exposes how
constitutional fault lines are constructed. The strategic use of the constitution by
conservative interest groups came at a price which was the politicization of judicial
review. The original understanding that judicial review was an apolitical exercise
collapsed when the Court clashed with important political currents: “In deciding . . . to
protect property rights and individual economic liberty at the expense of those who were
using legislative power to promote their vision of a just and good society, judges were
seen by progressive reformers to be engaging in a fundamentally different activity than
which John Marshall had engaged in when his Court, early in the nineteenth century, had
commenced the judiciary’s protection of property.”108 The Court’s attempt to effectuate
an interest free democratic politics became untenable once it was perceived that the Court
was allied with business interests that sought to entrench their policy preferences from
the channels of ordinary political change.109 The Lochner era illustrates that attempts to
use the Constitution by factions to protect their interests from politics can arouse a
popular counter-mobilization that shifts the battle from the legislative to the
constitutional arena.
The judicial effort to protect property rights broadly construed against popular
political forces collapsed in what has become known as the Constitutional Revolution of
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1937.110 The government sought to use its regulatory and spending powers to alleviate
the ills caused by the Depression.111 From 1935 to 1936, however, the Supreme Court
held fast to the old dividing line between law and politics when it derailed many New
Deal initiatives. Franklin Roosevelt understood that he would have to do battle with the
Supreme Court to fashion a vigorous federal response to the Depression.112 He
considered but rejected a constitutional amendment as too difficult politically and too
uncertain as any amendment would be interpreted by the Court.113 Instead, Roosevelt
proposed a plan to increase the membership of the Court.114 Although Roosevelt failed in
his bid to entrench his partisans on the Court, the Court changed course.115 The Supreme
Court announced that henceforth it would provide only cursory review of economic rights
while conducting a more searching review of individual liberties.116 By deciding on a
court packing plan, Roosevelt fashioned an important precedent in constitutional politics.
The rigors of Article V meant that henceforth those seeking constitutional change would
look to the appointments process as the only viable vehicle to achieve their aims.
The scholarship that revolves around the import of the Constitutional Revolution
of 1937 focuses on the highly visible doctrinal changes that occurred in its wake while
ignoring the more important but subterranean transformations that occurred in the
linkages between the people and the Court. The rights revolution involved legal and
social transformations. Economic growth played an important role in fueling the rights
revolution as it provided the wherewithal for a number of players, not just primarily
business actors as had been true in the second half of the nineteenth century, to
participate in and fund interest group activity aimed at constitutional litigation.117 The
judicial protection of rights, moreover, would not have been possible without the
involvement of citizens who were willing to mobilize to fashion and effectuate rights.118
A new model of citizenship arose as citizens increasingly became seen as the bearers of
constitutionally protected rights.119 The civil rights movement, in particular, “provided a
model and inspiration for a wide variety of new social movements and political
organizations” and helped fix a “rights-centered citizenship at the center of American
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civil aspiration.”120 The broad guarantees contained in the Constitution were effectuated
not simply from above by the Supreme Court but also from below by the thickening of
interest group activity that supported a broad array of constitutional litigation.121 The
doctrinal constitutional rights revolution, in short, both facilitated and was supported by
legal mobilization.
The Constitutional Revolution of 1937 also looms large in scholarly attempts to
understand efforts by conservatives to transform the meaning of the Constitution. In
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,122 Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford
Levinson argue that the conservative turn of the Supreme Court can best be explained by
a theory of “partisan entrenchment.”123 The theory posits that constitutional politics is no
different today than in F.D.R.’s day because the Court ultimately reflects popular opinion
through the process of judicial appointments.124 Constitutional change occurs through
judicial interpretation as Presidents seek to change the meaning of the Constitution by
placing their partisans on the Supreme Court. The theory of partisan entrenchment very
usefully highlights the role that battles over appointments play in transforming the
Constitution. This Article argues, however, that current conservative attempts to change
the membership of the Court are not simply constitutional politics as usual for three
reasons. First, the bureaucratic capacity to identify ideological appointees has improved
markedly since F.D.R. was president. Second, the conservative turn in the Court is not
simply a reflection of majoritarian views but rather reflect the views of influential
factions within the Republican coalition that have intense preferences over judicial
appointments. Third, current appointments battles have negative implications for the
long-term health of American democracy.
The problem with theories that seek to build on the lessons of F.D.R.’s court
packing plan to understand attempts by conservatives to transform the Court is that the
analogy is flawed. Ronald Reagan, much like F.D.R., came into office critical of a
number of Supreme Court decisions and determined to transform the Constitution by
changing the membership of the Court. Ronald Reagan, however, had in place a
bureaucratic apparatus which previous presidents lacked that enabled his administration
to thoroughly vet the ideology of his nominees.125 The Reagan Justice Department
through the Office of Legal Policy articulated a view of the Constitution in a series of
reports that was strikingly critical of existing doctrine.126 The Office of Legal Policy also
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emphasized the importance of judicial ideology in seeking to transform the
Constitution.127 The Reagan administration established ideological criteria for judicial
nominations and then searched for nominees who complied with those criteria. Professor
Yalof concludes that the examination by the administration of the ideological view of
potential Supreme Court nominees was unprecedented.128
Partisan entrenchment by the Reagan and subsequent conservative administrations
was not simply a result of presidential politics. The modern conservative movement
arose in direct response to judicial decisions that directly challenged many core
conservative beliefs.129 It is no accident that “[b]attles over abortion, birth control, the
Equal Rights Amendment, and other gender-based issues (and, more recently, battles
over homosexuality) have mobilized the fundamentalist right more successfully and
energetically than any other issues.”130 As Professor Feldman notes, we are a nation
divided over issues that “go to the very heart of who we are as a nation.”131 Perhaps no
modern constitutional case played a more important role in dividing the nation along
lines of supposed good and evil than Roe v. Wade. Roe “infuriated a lightly sleeping
giant,” 132 by energizing a conservative movement that sees the opinion as the moral
equivalent of Dred Scott. Since the policies that social conservatives wish to change are
embedded in the Constitution primarily by means of judicial interpretation, the solution is
to change the make-up of the federal courts. The interest group activity that played a
crucial role in the appointments of John Roberts and Samuel Alito illustrates how
factions can form to change the path of the Court. Constitutional change occurs not only
as a result of pressure from above as presidents seek to transform the meaning of the
Constitution but also as a result of pressure from below as interest groups coalesce to
change the path of the Court. In short, the substantive decisions of the Court facilitated
the rise of a conservative counter-mobilization that seeks to transform the meaning of the
Constitution by appointing conservative partisans on the Supreme Court.
The appointments wars have long-term, negative consequences for American
democracy. Public support for the Court has eroded.133 Courts can play a role in
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ameliorating political conflict only if they are perceived to be independent of ideological
and social forces. E.P. Thompson in his classic Whigs and Hunters notes “If the law is
evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing. . . . The
essential precondition for the effectiveness of law . . . is that it shall display an
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just.”134 Democracies
require alternation in power by opposing factions. Constitutions play an important role in
facilitating regular turnover in power as the losing side knows that there are limits to
what the party in power can do. If, however, one faction can entrench its partisans in the
judicial system, then politics becomes polarized as the Constitution no longer moderates
but exacerbates conflict.135 American exceptionalism when it comes to appointments has
fueled distrust.
Although a vigorous debate is currently underway among scholars over reforming
judicial appointments,136 the debate is unlikely to bear fruit given the roadblocks to
reform.137 Other polities have powerful constitutional courts yet have managed to avoid
the appointments battles that plague the United States. The nations of continental
Europe, for example, largely require a supermajority for appointment to national high
courts.138 Canada allows for temporary legislative overrides of Supreme Court
decisions.139 The comparative experience shows the importance of democratizing
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judicial review by creating institutional mechanisms that make it impossible or unlikely
that factions will seek to transform the constitution by influencing appointments.
American constitutional theory, on the other hand, has turned not to institutional
mechanisms in seeking to curb the Court but to popular constitutionalism.
III. Ex Ante Popular Controls over the Constitution
For all the disagreement about what we mean by ‘republic,’ no one has ever
doubted that self-government is its essence and a constitution the purest distillate.
What kind of republic removes its constitution from the process of selfgoverning? Certainly not the one our Founders gave us. Is it one we prefer? The
choice, after all, is ours. The Supreme Court has made its grab for power. The
question is: will we let them get away with it?140
Power grabs understandably elicit scholarly attention. The revolutionary
transformations wrought by the Warren Court provided considerable and unprecedented
grist for the constitutional theory mill. Scholars sought to reconcile the jurisprudence of
the Warren Court with the belief that the Supreme Court must be a legal, rather than a
political, institution if it were to retain legitimacy. Both Bickel’s The Least Dangerous
Branch and Ely’s Democracy and Distrust, for example, sought to spin out normative
theories that justified the work of the Warren Court as a legal institution. Constitutional
theory posited that courts had the capacity to act in a principled fashion that other
political actors lacked.141 Constitutional theory did not take constitutional politics into
account in seeking to understand or legitimate the work of the Warren Court.
Constitutional theory faced a different set of challenges with the Rehnquist Court.
Legal academics largely did not approve of the Rehnquist Court142 which was obviously
more conservative and, somewhat less obviously, more activist than the Warren Court.143
More importantly, a transformation occurred in the criticism levied at the Supreme Court.
The bedrock assumption that the right normative theory could cabin the Court’s
discretion had been shattered.144 Conservative mistrust of liberal judicial activism that
140
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grew in response to the Warren Court was now joined by liberal mistrust of conservative
judicial activism in response to the Rehnquist Court.145 As a result, normative theories
that place the Supreme Court at the center of the constitutional pantheon must now
contend with more radical and populist critiques that aim at dethroning the Court as the
supreme interpreter of the Constitution. These theories rest on the assumption that if law
does not limit judicial discretion, then perhaps politics can. Constitutional theory which
once overwhelmingly stressed how judges ought to interpret the law has important new
offshoots that look to the role that we the people might play in constraining judicial
discretion.146 Constitutional theory, in short, no longer ignores the role of constitutional
politics.
Larry Kramer is a forceful exponent of the need to curtail the power of the
Supreme Court. In The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review,147 Larry Kramer argues that the founding generation had a very different
understanding of the Constitution than the one we hold today. The original
understanding was that the people made the Constitution and, contrary to modern
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practice, also maintained and interpreted it. Fundamental law was popular law because it
rested on consent and immemorial custom. It could be changed only by revolution and
by the slow accretion of social change. The “idea of turning [any part of] this
responsibility over to judges was simply unthinkable.”148 Modern legal commentators,
on the other hand, argue that Framers sought to “create a self-correcting system of checks
and balances whose fundamental operations could all take place from within the
government itself, with minimal involvement or interference from the people.”149 The
modern view divorces politics from law by entrusting the maintenance of the Constitution
to the Supreme Court rather than to the people. Kramer believes that the modern view
has debilitated the citizenry and exacerbated political conflict. He concludes that the
problems currently afflicting American democracy would be alleviated if the people were
brought back into the mainstream of constitutional maintenance and interpretation,
thereby recovering the lost Arcadian world of the founders.
An important and negative consequence of the displacement of the people by the
Court is the increased politicization of the nomination process. Appointments
increasingly matter as the Court has become the last and the supreme word on the
meaning of the Constitution. Other polities, Kramer argues, have solved the problem of
democratic debilitation by adopting a different form of judicial review:
The nations of modern Europe have found more sensible ways to handle this
problem of control. . . . Appointments to the bench . . . typically require a
supermajority . . . guaranteeing that constitutional courts have a mainstream
ideology, while judges serve terms that are limited and staggered to ensure a
regular turnover. In addition, the constitutions themselves are more easily
amended than ours. The combined effect of these innovations is to relieve the
pressure a doctrine of supremacy creates by reducing the likelihood of serious
breaches between the constitutional court and the other branches of government,
and by making political correctives easier to implement when breaches occur.150
While Kramer is right that the European model of judicial review makes
important improvements on the American model, his analysis of what is flawed with
American constitutionalism is wrong. The Supreme Court’s assertion of supremacy did
not debilitate the people but mobilized them to seek to place their partisans on the Court.
Social conservatives have strong views on what the Constitution means and do not
supinely accept constitutional decisions they believe are wrong. The problem is that a
mobilized citizenry can erode judicial independence. Courts can ameliorate political
conflict only if they are perceived as neutral arbiters. A judiciary that is seen as
accountable to a political faction, on the other hand, lacks legitimacy.151 American
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exceptionalism in judicial appointments undermines constitutionalism by shrinking the
distance between the people and the institutions of governance.152
European constitutionalism works because appointment rules structure
constitutional politics differently not because European nations have virtuous citizens that
behave like the ideal of the founding generation. Factions cannot seek to change
constitutions by changing the personnel of national high courts because a supermajority is
typically required to appoint constitutional judges. European constitutionalism has
different ex ante popular controls of the constitution than does the United States because
European constitutionalism rests on very different assumptions. The appointment rules
for the American Supreme Court were crafted in the late eighteenth century when the
power that the Court would one day wield was unimaginable. When the nations of
continental Europe created constitutional courts in the wake of World War II, on the
other hand, there was no doubt, as richly evidenced by the history of the United States
Supreme Court, that a court with the authority to interpret a constitution was a powerful
political actor.
The European model of judicial review
Europe could not simply graft American style judicial review in constructing
constitutional judicial review after World War II153 for two reasons. First, the intellectual
environment of late twentieth century Europe was profoundly different than that of late
eighteenth century America. The framers of the American constitution assumed that
there was a clear delineation between law and politics and that the new Supreme Court
would, therefore, be a court of law.154 After more than a century of American experience
with judicial review, it was clear to Europeans that the American Supreme Court was not
simply a legal institution but a political one as well.155 Second, the nations of continental
152
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Europe had a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty that was difficult to reconcile with
judicial review.156 Legislatures, not courts, were supreme in interpreting the constitution.
As a consequence, the strong form of American judicial review with its correspondingly
weak provisions for political accountability was unacceptable.157 These two factors led
Europeans to devise a different form of judicial review that acknowledges its political
nature by providing stronger democratic checks.
Although constitutional judicial review would not be adopted in Europe until after
World War II, an important debate occurred in the first half of the twentieth century. A
number of French public law scholars argued that American style judicial review should
be adopted.158 This intellectual movement criticized the “traditional [understanding of
the] separation of powers” and its “prohibition against judicial review.”159 These
scholars believed that adopting judicial review was the key to ensuring the supremacy of
the constitution over ordinary legislation. The attempt to graft judicial review was
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challenged, however, by scholars who criticized the American Supreme Court for
blocking social legislation by a “restrictive reading of the due process clause.”160
Lochner was a powerful anti-model161 for forces opposed to the adoption of American
style judicial review. The scholars who challenged the adoption of judicial review
succeeded in “destroying whatever effective political support existed within
parliament.”162
While the debate over adopting American style judicial review was vigorously
being waged in France during the first half of the twentieth century, the intellectual
groundwork for a different form of judicial review was being crafted in Austria by Hans
Kelsen.163 He understood that judicial review in Europe would have to take a different
form than in the United States so that it could please two groups that were at loggerheads:
“politicians suspicious of the judiciary and judicial power, and a pan-European
movement of prominent legal scholars who favored installing American judicial review
on the Continent.”164 Kelsen proposed that judicial review be exercised by a specialized
body, a constitutional court, with carefully circumscribed powers. He argued that a court
with the power to invalidate legislation because it contravened the constitution exercised
political as well as lawmaking authority.165 To limit this potentially dangerous delegation
of power, Kelsen distinguished between negative and positive lawmaking. The latter was
the province of the legislator, the former of judges. Kelsen believed the distinction
between negative and positive lawmaking could be maintained if constitutions did not
contain human rights due to their open-ended nature. Kelsen also argued that judicial
review should be exercised by specialized constitutional courts whose members were
selected by politicians. Kelsen “thought that a constitutional court ha[d] to be a special
kind of court because constitutional law was a special kind of law.”166 He also argued
that constitutional courts should review legislation before it was promulgated “thus
preserving the sovereign character of statute[s] within the legal system.”167
Kelsen’s ideas proved very influential in the construction of judicial review in
Europe after World War II. The desire to deal with the legacies of human rights
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violations led to the creation of specialized constitutional courts.168 The European model
of judicial review differs from American style of judicial review along three
dimensions.169 First, the European model provides one court, a constitutional court, with
a monopoly over constitutional adjudication.170 Judicial review is centralized in the
Europe whereas it is diffuse in the United States.171 Given Europe’s long tradition of
parliamentary supremacy, a specialized court that was empowered to deal with
constitutional issues was needed as a counterweight.172 The ordinary courts in Europe
lacked the independence and prestige to be able to effectively check parliament.173
Second, judicial review in Europe is abstract whereas it is concrete in the United
States.174 Review is abstract in Europe because statutes may be challenged before they
are promulgated. Review is concrete in the United States because courts may hear only
cases or controversies.175 Professor Stone Sweet writes “European constitutional courts
168
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were designed as relatively pure oracles of constitutional law.”176 Third, the appointment
procedures differ and appointments have term limits.177 The United States has a
majoritarian appointment process whereas the nations of Europe typically have a
supermajoritarian process.178 An important consequence that flows from requiring a
supermajority for appointment is that judges are more broadly representative of a polity’s
culture and ideals.179
There is considerable disagreement in the literature whether these differences
matter. One view focuses on the substantive divergences between European and
American constitutionalism.180 In a number of substantive areas such as freedom of
speech,181 the protection of human dignity,182 the protective function of the state,183 and
176
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the role of international factors in domestic constitutionalism,184 European
constitutionalism clearly differs from American constitutionalism. A contrary view
argues that “despite obvious differences between American and European systems of
review, there is an increasing convergence in how review actually operates.”185 Professor
Stone Sweet concludes that the United States Supreme Court is becoming specialized in
constitutional law like its constitutional court counterparts in Europe whereas European
abstract review is becoming more concrete.
The difficulty in comparing European and American constitutionalism is that the
obvious differences such as specialized courts exercising abstract review matter less than
the differing appointments mechanisms. Professor Michel Rosenfeld notes that the
abstract nature of judicial review makes judicial review look more openly political than
does the concrete review exercised in the United States yet “American constitutional
adjudication has been attacked much more vehemently for being unduly political than its
European counterpart.”186 Europe transformed judicial review in the process of adopting
it by democratizing an inherently non-democratic institution. Constitutional review has
proven less problematic in Europe than in the United States in large part because
supermajority provisions ensure that there is less ideological polarization on European
constitutional courts than on the United States Supreme Court. European courts can and
do issue decisions that lead to a political backlash. What cannot readily occur, however,
is the rise of a sustained social movement whose primary objective is to transform the
constitution by changing the membership of a nation’s high court. Such a goal would be
difficult given supermajority appointment provisions and also would make no sense
given that European constitutions are easier to amend than the American constitution.187
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by which the people can be empowered to exercise control over their Constitution.
Canada provides an example of how post facto controls may diminish the power of
factions by democratizing judicial review.
IV. Post Facto Popular Controls over the Constitution
Some think that the Supreme Court’s elaboration of constitutional law has given
us a rich vocabulary of practical political philosophy. It has not. It may have
given the Supreme Court and some constitutional lawyers such a vocabulary. . . .
The Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution give all of
us that opportunity. Perhaps it is time for us to reclaim it from the courts.188
A constitution is, as Karl Llewellyn once remarked, a “peculiar institution”
because it involves a way of “living and doing” of “well-nigh the whole population.”189
The existence of shared attitudes “toward the verbal symbol Constitution and toward any
person supposed to be attacking it”190 is crucial if constitutions are to limit power. The
court of public opinion, not a court of law, is the primary mechanism for enforcing
constitutions.191 Courts cannot limit power if citizens are unwilling to mobilize when
constitutional guarantees are violated.192 The question then is the role that courts play in
constructing and maintaining the attitudes needed to sustain constitutional democracy.
Popular constitutionalism is an intellectual project that posits a deep tension
between the attitudes and beliefs needed to sustain constitutional democracy and judicial
review.193 Kramer, for example, believes that the attitudes once shared by the virtuous
citizens of the Republic have been eroded by judicial supremacy. Mark Tushnet shares
with Kramer the view that judicial review undermines the attitudes needed to sustain
democracy but Tushnet’s criticism runs deeper than Kramer. In Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts,194 Tushnet aims at doing away with judicial review, not just
judicial supremacy, in construing the Constitution. Judicial review, he argues “amounts
188
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to noise around zero” because it “offers essentially random changes, sometimes good and
sometimes bad, to what the political system produces.”195
Tushnet’s attack on judicial review is based on the distinction he makes between
the thin and the thick constitution. The thin constitution consists of the principles
embedded in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution that
constitute the nation. The thick constitution, on the other hand, consists of the detailed
provisions that organize the government. The provisions of the thick constitution are
important but they neither “generate” passion nor adherence to the Constitution.196 The
people can be “committed to the thin Constitution in ways they could never be committed
to the thick Constitution.”197 The problem with judicial review is that the public learns to
leave important issues to the courts thereby eroding public discussion and adherence to
the thin constitution. He concludes his attack on judicial review by suggesting that
perhaps we need an amendment precluding courts from construing the constitution.198
By doing away with judicial review, Tushnet seeks to make space for the people to
discuss the “Constitution’s meaning . . . in the ordinary venues for political
discussion.”199
In seeking to take the constitution away from the courts, Tushnet fails to
appreciate why democracies choose to provide judicial protection of rights. Rights that
are embedded in politics, but not the law, as Tushnet urges, can be effectuated only
through electoral channels. The problem with relying solely on elections to effectuate
rights is that there are a number of roadblocks to collective action. Polities throughout
the world have adopted judicially enforceable constitutional guarantees because they
allow individuals to effectuate their rights at a lower cost than having to seek political
vindication of such rights. Legalizing rights, moreover, does not debilitate democracy as
Tushnet argues. The law is a democratic form of policymaking because it relies on
citizens filing suits.200 Courts cannot effectuate rights without a stream of litigation. The
real problem in constitutional engineering, therefore, is to find a balance between politics
and law so that courts do not gain mastery over the constitution at the expense of the
people. A more effective means for taking the constitution away from the courts—one
that respects the political economy of rights—is provided by Canada’s post facto popular
control of constitutionalism.
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The Canadian model of judicial review
The question popular constitutionalism wrestles with is how the dictates of a
constitution can best be made effective. There were historically two answers to that
question: politics or law.201 The former is the Westminster model of parliamentary
supremacy; the latter the American system of judicial review. The Westminster model,
which was once the dominant model among the world’s more stable democracies, no
longer exists in its pure form.202 The nations of continental European adopted judicial
review in the wake of the Second World War. They rejected the American strong form
of judicial review and democratized the practice by adopting supermajoritian
appointment procedures.203 The last set of stable democracies to adopt judicial review
were the nations of the British commonwealth but they too rejected the pure American
model since they give courts the first, but not the last word, in exercising judicial
review.204 Democracy may not have conquered the world but judicial review, in some
form or other, has conquered democracy. Popular constitutionalism is swimming against
a worldwide historical current.
The Canadian model of judicial review demonstrates that judicial review need not
be joined at the hip with judicial supremacy even if that line has been blurred by
American courts.205 The conclusion reached by the United States Supreme Court that
courts must have the last word in construing the Constitution lest constitutional
supremacy by undermined has been rejected by Canada. Section 33 of the Canadian
Constitution provides:
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature . . . that the Act or a provision thereof shall
operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of
this Charter.206
Section 33, or the notwithstanding clause, seeks to bridge the divide between British
practice of politicizing the enforcement of rights and the American practice of
judicializing the enforcement of rights. It has been reviled and praised by Canadian
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politicians207 as well as scholars who dispute how well it comports with Canadian
democracy.208 Section 33 has also become an important topic in comparative
constitutional theory as scholars disagree whether it marks a new form of judicial
review.209
The origins of Section 33 can be found in section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights
(“CBOR”) of 1960.210 CBOR, however, was a statutory bill of rights and had little
impact because the courts “viewed their power through the traditional lens of
parliamentary supremacy.211 Unhappiness with CBOR’s lack of effectiveness provided
the impetus for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.212 Pierre Trudeau initiated the
process that would eventually culminate in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
when he was elected Prime Minister in 1968. In the final negotiations that led to the
adoption of the Charter, there was considerable opposition on the part of the provinces to
a constitutionalized and entrenched bill of rights.213 Professor Weiler notes “The source
of the provincial leaders’ concern was the same as the source of the Charter’s popular
attraction: observation of Canada’s next-door neighbor’s two centuries of experience with
constitutionalized rights.”214 Section 33, or the notwithstanding clause, was adopted as
the result of a last minute compromise that made possible the adoption of the Canadian
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms.215 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom sought
to adopt the more attractive features of American constitutionalism and reject its more
repellant ones by constitutionalizing rights while allowing a legislative override.216
Although the notwithstanding clause was crucial to the adoption of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and clearly has important theoretical implications, it has not fared
well in Canada’s constitutional politics. The few times it has been used have proven
controversial. Quebec used the notwithstanding clause to protect primarily language
rights.217 This led to a strong negative reaction218 as language rights for the French
minority is a contentious political and constitutional issue.219 The political
“demonization” of Section 33 has spread to other issues.220 The two major political
parties have wrangled over whether to use the notwithstanding clause to deal with the
Canadian Supreme Court’s recent decision on same-sex marriage.221 The politicization
of same sex marriage in Canada represents the mirror of how that issue has been
politicized in the United States. In the United States, it has been conservatives who have
successfully used same sex marriage as a wedge issue to mobilize voters. In Canada, it
has been the Liberal Party that has successfully portrayed the Conservative Party’s
willingness to use the notwithstanding clause to deal with the same sex jurisprudence of
the Canadian Supreme Court as “hostility to the Charter itself and thus to fundamental
Canadian values.”222 Any attempt by the federal or a provincial government to use the
notwithstanding language in proposed legislation allows the supporters of the primacy of
215
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the judiciary in construing the Charter to mobilize. As a consequence, governments have
been “exceedingly reluctant to use [section] 33.” 223
Section 33 has had not only a checkered political history but has also been a
matter of dispute among scholars who debate whether it contributes to Canada’s
democracy. Scholars who believe that section 33 contributes to a democratic “dialogue”
between legislatures and courts stress that it resolves the countermajoritarian difficulty.224
Courts are afforded the power of judicial review to ensure that all organs of government
are subject to constitutional dictates. The problem, of course, is that constitutional
restrictions on power are open-ended and afford courts considerable discretion.225
Professor Weiler notes that the “’fancy claims’ lawyers make about the superiority of
judges” in construing the constitution must be balanced against the reality that
legislatures are better equipped to make policy decisions.226 Section 33 deals with this
problem by providing both courts and legislatures the authority to determine
constitutional meaning. Scholars who disagree that section 33 contributes to a
democratic dialogue point, rather unsurprisingly, to its relative lack of use.227 Professor
Manfredi argues that judicial review is necessary to make checks and balances work yet
courts are not subject to any effective checks since section 33 has seldom been used.
Section 33, in short, may provide a formal solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty
while not resolving the debilitation problem that may occur when courts gain supremacy
over constitutional construction.228
Comparative scholars debate whether section 33 represents an important
constitutional innovation. Professor Gardbaum argues that Canada is part of a trend
among Commonwealth nations to find a middle way between parliamentary and judicial
supremacy in construing a constitution.229 The notwithstanding clause prevents courts
from unduly interfering with legislatures by democratizing judicial review. It was
designed to prevent the possibility of the impasse between Congress and the Supreme
Court that led to Franklin Roosevelt’s court packing plan.230 It also serves as a
breakwater for social mobilization. When factions are angered by judicial decisions, they
are more likely to pursue an override than to seek to influence the appointments
process.231 Professor Mark Tushnet, on the other hand, argues that as a practical matter
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Canadian courts are supreme in construing the Charter as section 33 is seldom used.232
The desuetude of section 33 for Professor Tushnet is proof that the public has accepted
judicial supremacy as legislatures find it politically unpalatable to override judicial
decisions they disagree with. For Professor Tushnet, there is no middle ground between
parliamentary and judicial supremacy.
This Article argues that the importance of Section 33 lies along a different
dimension which is how it structures the relationship between society and courts.
Canada’s Supreme Court is more susceptible than the United States Supreme Court to the
problem of faction. There are three principal mechanisms that polities use in appointing
Justices: monocratic (Canada), majoritarian (the United States), and supermajoritarian
(the European model).233 Canada follows the British model in providing the chief
executive virtually unfettered authority to appoint Justices.234 The British system worked
well when paired with parliamentary supremacy but is problematic when courts have the
final word on what the constitution means. Canada, however, has not yet experienced the
appointment wars that are now part of the American constitutional political landscape.
The Charter is quite new and the Liberal Party has dominated the government for much
of its existence which means that there has been little in the way of political struggle over
appointments.235 More importantly, as the American experience suggests, citizen
mobilization over appointments is fashioned in a long-term, historical process. With
increased experience under the Charter, Canadians may seek to exert greater control over
the Court as they begin to “appreciate the important role of personalities and judicial
philosophies in the interpretation and application of Charter norms.”236
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The importance of section 33 was illustrated by the debate between the two
leading candidates to become Canada’s Prime Minister in January 2006. The liberal
candidate, Paul Martin, sought to gain electoral ground on the conservative front-runner,
Stephen Harper, by “pledging to repeal Ottawa’s power to override the Charter of
Rights.”237 Harper opposes same-sex marriage but pledged not to use the
notwithstanding clause to outlaw same sex-marriage. Martin’s promise to end the federal
government’s power to use the override was made to sharpen the parties’ difference on
the issue of same-sex marriage. There was considerable criticism of Martin’s proposal,
however, which suggests that the retention of notwithstanding clause has political
support.238 The reason that there is more support for retaining the notwithstanding clause
than there is for its use lies in the function it plays. Professor Choudry notes: “To its
defenders, the override serves as an outlet, channeling potentially dangerous and
destructive responses to judicial review into legislative forums where brute power is
tempered by the demands of public justification and the procedures for parliamentary
democracy.”239 In particular, if the citizens are unhappy with a particular constitutional
provision, they are more likely to seek a legislative override than to pack the courts with
their supporters.240 Section 33 allows courts to issue opinions that roil the political
waters while making it less likely that the factions will seek to dominate the appointments
process. The notwithstanding clause, in short, functions not unlike the "beware of dog"
sign that some homeowners put up even though they do not actually own a dog.
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V. Conclusions: Democratizing Judicial Review
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in
personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a
duty from which they may not shrink to decide cases properly brought before
them, and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political
purposes.241
Lincoln certainly had it right when he argued that the people will have ceased to
be their own rulers if courts were to gain constitutional supremacy. The world’s
democracies and constitutional theory have been on oddly convergent paths as both seek
to balance the power of courts and the people over constitutional meaning by
democratizing judicial review. The twentieth century witnessed a worldwide expansion
of judicial review242 as nations democratized243 but polities rejected American style
strong form review with its correspondingly weak form of political accountability. No
polity could readily ignore the power exercised by the American Supreme Court in
designing judicial review in the twentieth century. Although there are a number of
mechanisms that may be used to cabin courts, modern democracies have overwhelmingly
relied on ex ante and post facto mechanisms of popular control over the meaning of the
constitution.
Constitutional theory rather oddly ignored the role that citizens play in shaping
constitutional meaning until the advent of popular constitutionalism. American debates
over the propriety of judicial review were long trapped in a weird nineteenth century time
warp that courts exercise only judgment244 whereas legislatures exercise will. The
countermajoritarian difficulty at bottom posits that courts should police themselves by
adopting the correct interpretive theory lest they trample on democracy. The problem
with Bickel and his interlocutors is that they ignore the role that the people play in
maintaining the Constitution as a living institution. The counter-constitutional difficulty,
on the other hand, acknowledges that the people, not the courts, should be the ultimate
arbiter of what the Constitution means.
Courts can and do, however, further the interests of factions rather than those of
we the people.245 This Article argues that the tension between law and politics, which
constitutional theory sought to resolve by grappling with the countermajoritarian
241
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difficulty, looks very different when viewed from the vantage point of constitutional
politics. The problem is not that courts might impermissibly interfere with legislatures
but that judicial review might facilitate a form of constitutional politics that threatens to
undermine the constitution. The easiest way to amend the Constitution is to place one’s
partisans on the Supreme Court given the rigors of Article V. A number of decisions by
the Court have played an important role in mobilizing religious conservatives who now
seek to amend the Constitution by transforming the membership of the Court. The
appointments battles that led to the nominations of Justices Roberts and Alito and to the
withdrawal of Harriet Miers illustrate the strategy and the power of this conservative
movement. By playing an important role in nomination battles, factions shape the
meaning of the Constitution. The polarization in the appointments process, in short,
illustrates the Achilles heel of the Constitution.
Popular constitutionalism departs from much existing constitutional theory by
bringing we the people back into our understanding of how constitutional meaning is
shaped. Professor Kramer fears that the arrogation of judicial supremacy by the Supreme
Court will undermine the republican virtues needed to sustain democracy. Professor
Tushnet is concerned that judicial review “amounts to noise around zero.” The United
States would be better off without it, he argues, so that Americans could discuss the
principles that constitute their collective national identity in the venues of ordinary
politics. Kramer and Tushnet are right to underscore the danger of citizens losing
attachment to the Constitution.
The problem with popular constitutionalism, however, is that the people have
never supinely accepted the power of a political body, even one as august as the Supreme
Court of the United States, to define the identity of a nation. American history is replete
with social movements that fought over the meaning of the Constitution.246 Social
movements can seek constitutional change either by changing public opinion or by
changing the membership of the Supreme Court.247 The former plays a key role in
maintaining the constitution as a living institution248 whereas the latter erodes democracy.
Constitutional democracy works when it channels social forces seeking change into a two
level game. A bare majority is needed to change ordinary law whereas a supermajority is
required to change the Constitution. Appointments battles blur the line between ordinary
and constitutional politics that is critical for the long-term viability of democracy.249
246

See Part II infra. Indeed the comparative evidence is quite strong that one of
the consequences of providing courts with the power of judicial review is that social
movements will orient their activity towards winning legal as well as political victories.
F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTY
(2000).
247
Balkin, supra note __.
248
Reva B. Siegal, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States
Constitutional Law, available at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/SELA%202004/SiegelPaperEnglishSELA2004.pdf
(2004) and Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools, & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1331 (1995).
249
The collapse of the distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics led
to dictatorship and oligarchy throughout much of Latin America’s history. Miguel Schor,
40

Appointment battles not only erode the rigidity of a constitution but also
undermine the ability of courts to ameliorate political conflict.250 Polities throughout
space and time rely on courts to handle disputes because it is universally understood that
a neutral third party is the fairest means for resolving disputes.251 For courts to be able to
reduce social tensions, however, they must be perceived as fair and independent. If
courts are seen as the pawn of interest group struggles, the social trust they need to
ameliorate political conflict is eroded. As E.P. Thompson writes, “If the law is evidently
partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any
class’s hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law . . . . is that it
shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just.”252
The American adherence to weak political controls over constitutional review is
deeply ingrained but the die that was cast in Philadelphia was more the result of historical
accident than any prolonged inquiry. Constitution makers are not free to remake the
world anew but are constrained by the operative assumptions of the intellectual milieu
within which they operate as well as political reality.253 The intellectual assumption on
which American judicial review is built is a sharp distinction between law and politics.
This distinction provided the intellectual foundations of Marbury v. Madison254 and
continues to provide the grist for the continuing fascination that constitutional scholars
have for Bickel’s countermajoritarian mill. If what the courts do is law and what
legislatures do is politics, then maintaining the distinction between these two spheres is
critical if judicial review is to be legitimate in a democracy.
The institutional counterpoint to the distinction between law and politics that the
framers uncritically assumed are the weak forms of democratic control that the Supreme
Court is subject to. It is not surprising that elites whose lives spanned a transformation
from a monarchical and hierarchical society to a republican and egalitarian one255 would
fear the very changes they helped usher in.256 They understood that democracy would
bring about important social transformations and sought to hem these changes in by
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fashioning a court free of democratic constraints that would stand guard over what
majorities could do.257 Lifetime tenure coupled with virtuous judges drawn from a
narrow circle would hopefully prevent future democratic majorities from working their
will.
It should not be that surprising that the United States got it wrong and the rest of
the world got it more or less right when it comes to judicial review. The framers could
not foresee the role that judicial review would play in American politics. The continued
American adherence to weak political controls over judicial review owes more to path
dependency than to an ideological commitment to judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation. The democratic changes made to judicial review in the process of legal
transplantation in Europe and in Canada are significant. These changes can best be
explained by the notion of political learning. Elites study and learn from the legal and
political experience of other nations.258 The rest of the world adopted stronger political
controls over their respective supreme courts because elites in those polities
understandably feared fashioning a constitutional court that would exercise the power of
the American Supreme Court. No nation adopting judicial review in the late twentieth
century could ignore the political dimensions of constitutional law. As a consequence of
this political learning, the nations of continental Europe constructed a different
appointments process that makes it very difficult for minorities to place their partisans on
a nation’s highest court. Canada made it unlikely that factions would arise to seek to
control its highest court by allowing for the possibility of a legislative override. The
European and Canadian forms of judicial review, in short, sought to preserve a stronger
role for Parliament by creating stronger democratic constraints on judicial review.
The problem in designing judicial review lies in how best to design the
institutional mechanisms that enable citizens to exercise control over the meaning of the
constitution. As the following table illustrates, American exceptionalism forces citizens
to utilize ex ante mechanisms of control whereas other polities structure judicial review
to facilitate post facto control mechanisms:
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POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY259

Weak

Ex Ante
(Appointments)

Post Facto
(Legislative override,
amendments)

Monocratic (Canada)
Majoritarian (United States)

United States (supermajority
required both in Congress
and among the states)

Supermajoritarian (Europe)

Europe (typically
supermajority required in
Parliament)

Strong

Canada (majority for
temporary override)
Citizens in the United States have little choice but to engage in appointments battles
given the difficulty of amending the Constitution. Citizens in a polity that has the
European model of judicial review, on the other hand, will be more likely to seek
constitutional change through amendment than through the uncertain path of changing
the membership of a constitutional court. Canada falls in between the American and
European models of judicial review as citizens can influence both appointments and seek
a legislative override. Social movements are more likely to seek an override than to seek
to change the membership of the Canadian Supreme Court, however, given that
appointments battles produce an uncertain pay-off. Post facto mechanisms are superior
to ex ante mechanisms of popular control as they neither interfere with judicial
independence nor undermine constitutional rigidity.
Bickel and his interlocutors would have done well to have considered
comparatively how judicial review shapes the politics of constitutional change. The
countermajoritarian difficulty has dominated constitutional theory in this country for over
half a century. The problem has had less purchase abroad because constitutional courts
are subject to greater political oversight than they are in the United States. The
experience of the United States teaches us that courts can become a dangerous branch if
they lack efficacious mechanisms of democratic control. The experience of Europe and
Canada teaches us that by ensuring that democratic majorities have some power over
either the make-up of constitutional courts or over their decisions, courts do a better job
of ameliorating political conflict. In short, the countermajoritarian difficulty dissolves
when judicial review is democratized so that courts cannot be counterconstitutional
actors.

259

Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 237 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
43

